"Continuity and Change in the post-Constitution EU Presidency: A New Actor in Town?" by Pagoulatos, George et al.
1
EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference
March 31- April 2, 2005
Austin, Texas
 
Continuity and Change in the post-Constitution EU Presidency:
A New Actor in Town?
George Pagoulatos*, Spyros Blavoukos** and Dimitris Bourantonis*
* Assistant Professor, Department of International and European Economic Studies, Athens
University of Economics and Business
** PhD candidate, University of Essex
Contact email: gpag@aueb.gr
Abstract:  In the post-Constitution EU, the rotating Presidency has been replaced by a hybrid
system combining a rotating component with the establishment of a permanent President for the
European Council (and a Minister of Foreign Affairs). We examine how the new system came into
being, the significant departure from past institutional arrangements and practices and most
importantly the implications of such a development for the EU political order. The new system sets
in place a new institutional actor; the question we address is whether this new institutional actor has
the potential of evolving into an autonomous political actor as well. Using a principal-agent
framework we look at the various functions of the President, the available resources, and the
endogenous and exogenous parameters that will affect the President’s effectiveness and efficiency,
with particular emphasis on the control mechanisms set up by member states to check the
President’s actions. Our analysis suggests an unmistakable though by no means unconditional
strengthening of the Presidency’s potential for an autonomous political role in the new EU
constitutional architecture.
Keywords: EU President, Constitution, European Council, principal-agent.2
Introduction
The Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, currently under ratification, constitutes another
attempt to adjust the over-stretched EU institutional structures to the new environment that emerged
following the latest enlargement round. The main issues on the agenda of the Convention and the
subsequent IGC concerned primarily the institutional design of the enlarged EU, in particular the
weighing of votes in the Council, the formation of the Commission and the EU Presidency system.
It is this last agenda item that constitutes the focus of this paper. Rotating Presidencies for a long
time have attracted little attention, with some notable exceptions. A few early publications dealt
explicitly with the Presidency (Wallace and Edwards 1976; Dewost 1984; Wallace 1985; de
Bassompierre 1988; Kirchner 1992), with some additional input from works on the Council of
Ministers (Westlake 1995; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Sherrington 2000). Case studies
dwelled on the general record of particular Presidencies, their performance in particular fields or
their role in IGC negotiations.
1 Departing from the earlier descriptive focus, more recent
comparative work has attempted to provide a more compact typology of Presidential functions and
parameters affecting the efficiency of each Presidency (Elgström 2003; Tallberg 2004, 2003;
Metcalfe 1998, etc.). By the time the Presidency had begun to attract the attention of the academic
community, the Draft Constitution came to alter considerably the terms and conditions under which
the Presidency operates. 
In that respect, the emerging, post-Constitution, hybrid system needs to be closely examined. It
combines permanent and rotating Presidencies, the former for the European Council and the
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the latter for the other technical Councils. According to
the Constitutional Treaty, the European Council President will be elected by qualified majority vote
for a term of two and a half years renewable once. In the event of an impediment or serious
misconduct, the President’s term in office can be ended with the same voting procedure. The tasks
of the President include chairing the European Council and driving forward its work, providing
preparation and continuity, facilitating cohesion and consensus within the European Council and
ensuring the external representation of the Union without prejudice to the powers of the Union
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Article I-22). The Union Minister will have a ‘double hat’ presiding
over the Foreign Affairs Council and being one of the vice presidents of the Commission. The
Minister’s primary responsibility will be to ensure consistency of the Union’s external action
(Article I-28). Finally, the Presidency of the Council in its various formats will be held by member
state representatives on the basis of equal rotation in accordance with a decision to be reached at a
                                                
1 See for example the Presidencies' assessment in the Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review and South
European Society and Politics; Wurzel 1996, 2000; the contributions in the edited volumes by Elgström  (2003) and3
later stage at European Council level (Article I-24). The draft arrangement refers to pre-established
groups of three member-states for a period of 18 months, each member of the group chairing in turn
for a six-month period all configurations of the Council (Declaration on Article I-24 (7)).     
This new, two-tier system renders most previous scholarly work on Presidencies useful but
incomplete. This paper seeks to contribute to closing this literature gap. Adhering to the value as
well as the validity of theoretical eclecticism, insights from various strands of institutionalist and
intergovernmentalist theory are used to examine continuity and change in the new system. To do so
we need to address whether the new system leads to changes in the functions of the Presidency and
the parameters affecting its effectiveness and efficiency.
2 Even more importantly perhaps, we need
to understand the reasons for such an institutional change and question whether a new political actor
has come to town, which would have significant implications for the inter-institutional balance of
power and the pace and scope of integration. 
The paper comprises two sections. Starting with a review of the evolutionary nature of the
Presidency, the first section presents the debate in the European Convention and the IGC,
highlighting the significant rupture with earlier practices. This rupture occurred both with regard to
the institutional outcome (emergence of new supranational actors in the posts of the permanent
President and the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the procedure through which this outcome
was reached (being the focus of a major intergovernmental bargaining). The section addresses two
questions: why was this hybrid system of Presidency set up in the first place and why did this
happen through an IGC? The second section focuses on the role of the permanent President in the
new institutional architecture in light of the problems inherent in any principal-agent relationship. It
discusses the conditions under which the new supranational actor can take advantage of the
potential, theory-prescribed, control slack and assesses such potential in view of the existing
institutional arrangements. 
Our contention is that radical changes in the EU environment have altered the way member-states
perceive the efficiency frontier of the Presidency system. That has increased demand for substantial
structural change, involving delegation of power and authority to a new body. Such a reform
constituted a departure from the evolutionary path of the Presidency, which explains why the issue
became one of the 'hot spots' of the last IGC. The fact that agreement on the Presidency system
required unanimity and was part of the broader Constitutional package deal largely explains the
hybrid format of the new system as a compromise between different perceptions of the most
                                                                                                                                                                 
O’Nuallain (1985); the relevant chapters in the edited volumes by Laursen and Vanhoonacker (1992) and Laursen
(2002) on the Maastricht and Amsterdam IGC negotiations respectively, etc.
2  We understand effectiveness as correspondence between goals and outcomes; with regard to the Presidency,
effectiveness denotes successful fulfillment of its tasks. We understand efficiency in input-output ratio terms; with
regard to the Presidency, the term denotes an efficient employment of resources towards realizing its objectives. 4
appropriate Presidency format. The structural features of the new system –in particular the
permanent President of the European Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs—allow for a
principal-agent conceptualization of the Presidency. We argue that the vague new systemic
environment is conducive to the President/agent exercising political entrepreneurship, bypassing the
Constitutional constraints to the President’s scope of intervention. Realizing this potential will
depend to a great extent on the capacity of the President to perform its functions and especially
provide political leadership and external representation in the complex EU-25 institutional
environment. 
Understanding Continuity and Change in the EU Presidency System Reform  
 
This section sets to portray the dynamics of institutional change in the EU Presidency system. We
argue that a fundamental change has taken place in the new system, in which the Presidency is no
longer considered an office/function of an institutional body (Council) but has acquired its own
institutional status. However, the pre-existing configuration has not been totally abandoned. As a
result, a hybrid system has been created that combines sovereignty pooling through the rotating
Council Presidency (in which all member states participate in turn), and some degree of power
delegation to new institutional actor(s). The section highlights the departure from earlier patterns in
terms of both outcome and negotiating process by briefly reviewing the genesis, evolution and
reform of the Presidency. It discusses the reasons for the specific institutional transmutation that
occurred in the Constitution-building process and its modality in the light of different theoretical
insights on institutional change.
Dynamics of Institutional Change in the EU
We broadly adhere to the rational design approach of institutions, acknowledging, however, that
this approach can explain much but not everything about institutional design. In brief, institutions
3,
whether with a highly formalized format or derived through informal and evolutionary processes,
embody significant rational design principles and are set in place to promote cooperation and make
it more resilient for the purpose of enhancing actors’ prosperity. In this functionalist logic,
particular institutional arrangements are preferred over others to further the individual and
collective goals of the actors involved. Therefore, the rationally anticipated effects of given
institutions, subject always to some degree of uncertainty, explain actor preferences for certain
types of institutions (Pollack 1997: 103; more generally Hall and Taylor 1996; Shepsle 1986, etc).
Subsequently, when specific institutional arrangements cease to perform these functions, they
                                                
3 Institutions are understood as single or complex sets of rules, either formally established or tacitly understood, which
govern actors’ interaction and prescribe their behavior (North 1990). Knowledge of these rules must be shared by all
members of the relevant community or society (Knight 1992:3).  5
become extinct or call for modification. In that respect institutional development and change may
arise due to new conditions or new problems that have rendered the existing institutional
arrangements dysfunctional or less capable of producing prosperity-enhancing negotiating
outcomes for all participants (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2004: 3-8). If the main reason for
institutional change/adaptation is the changing environment and its impact on the functions the
institution is expected to perform, the exact modality depends on the magnitude and implications of
the required change.
However, it would be quite unrealistic to assume total institutional 'thinness', which would suggest
continuous institutional changes following every single realignment of actors' preferences. That,
apart from presupposing a frictionless world, would lead to an infinite regress to temporary
institutional outcomes, canceling out any advantages from setting an institution. In that respect,
institutional design, continuity and change can be understood through at least three different
processes. Rational choice institutionalism casts aside short term, myopic actors' behavior and
considers the interaction of actors in an institutional environment along highly strategic terms, with
contracting parts acting instrumentally to maximize the attainment of their preferences over a longer
time frame (Hall and Taylor 1996: 944-945; Pettit 1996).
4 Hence, RCI postulates strategic actors'
interaction and a long-term 'calculus approach' to understand institutional genesis and evolution. In
some contrast, historical institutionalism argues that institutional stability is much owed to the
continuing and largely determinate influence of the formative set up choices on the later policy and
format institutional outcomes (Peters 1999: 63; Hall and Taylor 1996: 937-942; Thelen and Steinmo
1992). 'Path dependency' and 'critical junctures' (Krasner 1984) are used to describe the HI
argument and highlight the inertia that any institutional reform attempt needs to overcome. In this
view, HI implies a course of incremental evolution delimited by the (perhaps dysfunctional in the
present) decisions of the formative years punctuated with crises or windows of reform opportunity
that generate more substantial changes to the design and evolutionary course of the institution
(Peters 1999: 65). Finally, not fully adhering to the rationalist design but offering additional insights
to continuity and change of institutional structures, sociological institutionalism focuses on the
'social appropriateness' of specific institutional arrangements reflecting the actors' shared norms and
values in contrast to the logic of 'instrumentality' (Campbell 1989). In that respect, the prominence
of norms constitutes the key condition to the actors' policy and institutional predisposition, and
                                                
4 RCI can be distinguished to two approaches, functional and distributional, each of which emphasizes a different
mechanism of reaching institutional choices. The functional approach stresses the joint gains from solving collective
action problems by coordinating on a specific institutional outcome whereas the distributional approach focuses more
on the uneven distribution of the joint gains among the actors involved. Hence, in the distributional approach,
institutional outcomes will reflect asymmetries in actors' bargaining power rather than the mutually perceived
attractiveness of an efficient solution to a given collective action problem (Stacey and Rittberger 2003: 864-865; Knight
1995).  6
changes in the normative or ideational orthodoxy will lead to institutional change (Stacey and
Rittberger 2003: 866).
5   
Coming to the EU specific institutional setting, we should bear in mind that the EU's institutional
architecture has been the outcome of two different types of integration dynamics (Stacey and
Rittberger 2003: 863). The first one characterizes major intergovernmental conferences (IGCs),
whereby member-states’ governments have taken part in multilateral negotiations concluded by
pooling or delegating authority, power and national sovereignty to better serve national interests.
The institutional outcome of these history-making decisions has been the creation (and further
evolution) of collective majoritarian (Council) and supra-national (Commission, European Court of
Justice) bodies responsible for the scope and pace of European integration (Moravcsik 1998, 1993;
Milward 1992, etc). 
However, in conditions of bounded rationality, uncertainty and informational asymmetry among
negotiating partners, writing complete contracts is an extremely difficult and costly task. Hence,
instead of writing fully specified and minutely detailed agreements, contracting parties are prone to
commit to incomplete contracts, that is framework treaties or covenants that spell out in general
terms the obligations of all parties involved throughout the life of the contract (Pollack 1997: 103-
104; Williamson 1985: 3). Incomplete contracting also derives from the inherent difficulty of
contracting parties to construct agreements that anticipate every possible contingency especially in
interactions characterized by great dynamism such as those occurring in the EU milieu. As a result
of such incomplete contracting in the EU Treaties, further sovereignty pools and transfers have
occurred during the process of European integration. They have derived either from court-related
jurisprudence clarifying clauses of the founding Treaties or from informal rule creation through
day-to-day interaction (Stone Sweet 1999; Alter, 1998; Burley and Mattli 1993 etc). This
interregnum type of integration, being incremental in nature, occurs in-between formal bargains and
derives primarily -but not exclusively- not from member states but rather from other EU
supranational bodies (Stacey and Rittberger 2003: 863).
Hence, according to the type-specific, policy-making dynamics, institutional change in the EU may
occur either as a result of 'big-bang', history-making intergovernmental negotiations or as an
outcome of incremental adaptation taking advantage of the gaps in the constituent incomplete
contract. In the light of this dichotomy and in line with Puchala’s (1973) often-repeated ‘blind man
                                                
5 Note that rationality and norm-based behavior are not totally incompatible. The critical element that distinguishes the
two approaches is the underlying logic behind a norm-adjusted behavior. In the rationalist account, actors can adhere to
norms for instrumental reasons (assessment of possible political sanctions and damages on the future reputation as a
cooperative partner) on the basis of a logic of consequences. In the sociological account, actors internalize norms, as a
result of which they no longer make an active choice in conforming to them but adhere to them automatically
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 909-911). 7
and the elephant of integration' metaphor, different theoretical approaches can be applied to
understand policy-making dynamics in each integration type and explain delegation decisions and
specific institutional designs (Peterson and Bomberg 1999). 
 
Genesis, Evolution and Reform of the EU Presidency System
The Council Presidency grew in stature over time by default rather than by design (Kirchner 1992:
71). The founding Paris (Article 27) and Rome (EEC, Article 146 and Euratom, Article 116)
Treaties provided little substantial base for the emergence of another fully-fledged, institutional
body. The role originally envisaged for the Council Presidency was simply that of an ordered
sharing out of the responsibility to chair the Council's meetings. Largely considered a function and
an office attached to the Council rather than a separate institution, the Presidency followed the ebbs
and flows of the Council's evolution (Westlake 1995: 37; Kirchner 1992: 70). 
Two factors contributed substantially to the Presidency's ascendance in the EC/EU institutional
system: successful response to emerging functional needs and the lack of formal delimitation of the
presidential tasks (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 135). The former provided the impetus for
competence expansion and the latter ensured flexibility in the evolutionary process. Hence, a series
of important developments in the EC history mounted pressures on member states' governments to
exercise certain degree of political leadership and improve intergovernmental and inter-institutional
coordination.
6 These developments substantially altered the terms of intergovernmental and inter-
institutional interaction, the Presidency acquiring new coordinating, brokering and administrative
tasks with the implicit acquiescence of the Council. As a result of responding to the challenges and
coping with these tasks effectively, the Presidency grew out of its day-to-day managerial role to
enjoy a more strategic positioning in the EC/EU decision-making system, rendering almost
impossible a case of the Council reaching a decision against the desires of the Presidency (Johnston
1994: 25). This entrusting of authority was facilitated by the fact that no formal codification and
delimitation of the Presidential tasks and functions had ever been realized and explicitly put in the
EC/EU constituent documents.
7 Therefore, no formal negotiations or Treaty amendments were
                                                
6 Besides the Luxembourg compromise, these developments comprised the multiplication of Technical Councils and the
emergence of the European Council in the 1970s, the nascence of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and its
successor (CFSP), as well as the successive enlargements from six to fifteen members (Sherrington 2000: 41).
7 A first, 'practical, not legal' clarification of the Presidency's principal tasks was attempted as late as 1979, in the
'Report of the Three Wise Men'. According to that Report, the Presidency "…convenes meetings of the Council of
Ministers. It is responsible for advance preparation of the agenda; for the circulation of the necessary documents; for the
allocation of time at the meeting and the conduct of debate; for the formulation and implementation of decisions. The
Presidency's basic duty in this process is simply to get results. To do so it must work with technical efficiency, but also
exercise a strong and politically sensitive control of the proceedings. It must select for the agenda the items, which are
most urgent, important and ripe for handling. It must prevent time wasting and confusion at the meeting itself. It must
urge the debate towards conclusions by using the most appropriate combination of the weapons at its disposal (pressure,
mediation, compromise proposals, time limits, voting)" ('The Three Wise Men Report' 1979: 36). A very basic outline
of the Presidency's tasks was introduced in 1986, in the Single European Act (in Title III with regard to the European8
required for the readjustment of the Presidency's allocated competences. The gradual ascendance of
the Presidency as a key factor to the Council's functioning raised awareness, generated concerns
about its potential effectiveness and brought to the foreground reform proposals, which however
remained always at the fringes of negotiation in previous rounds of institutional reform.
8
In contrast to previous practices, however, the status and format of the Presidency became one of
the central issues in the European Convention and the subsequent IGC.
9 The first issue that was put
in the discussion was whether the Presidency should become the single locus of executive power
within the Union, merging the posts of the Commission and Council Presidents ('double hatted'
Presidency). Alternatively, the 'separate hats' version advocated separate Presidents for the
Commission and the (European) Council with executive power exercised by both (Craig 2004: 15;
Hoffman 2003).
10 The second highly contested issue with regard to the Presidency system once the
'separate hats' option came to the ascendance was the strengthening of the Presidency in the form of
some kind of more permanent structure and the abolition of the previous rotating scheme. Around
this issue, two camps were basically formed during the various stages of the debate. The first camp
advocated the radical overhaul of the existing rotating system of Presidency with the appointment of
a permanent President chosen by the European Council from among its former members. The idea
of a longer-term, strengthened Presidency was central to the 'ABC' view (Aznar, Blair, and Chirac)
supported by Spain, UK and France in the Convention. The joint Franco-German contribution
brought Germany on board in support of the permanent President format with the quid pro quo
acquiescence by the French side to an elected Commission President (CONV 489/03; Financial
Times 15.01.03). This suggestion was backed by Convention Chairman Giscard d' Estaing only to
cause the vehement reaction of the more pro-integration Convention members, the EP
representatives and the Commission (Norman 2003: 2).
11 Their strong reaction to the Presidium's
                                                                                                                                                                 
Political Cooperation) and in 1992, in the Treaty of European Union (more prominently in articles J and K establishing
the second and third pillars respectively). Updated and more detailed accounts were provided in the Council's Rules of
Procedure (for example ROP 1979, 1987, 1993). However, in all cases, the various clauses reflected established practice
-primarily from the foreign policy field (EPC or CFSP)- rather than prescribed new practice (Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace 1997: 139).
8 Ideas hovering in that debate included extended periods beyond the six months, team presidencies, the creation of a
'directorate', an elected presidency, an enhanced partnership of the Presidency and the Commission, etc (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 153-155).
9 Indicative of the sensitivity of the issue in question was the number of amendments submitted to the Articles referring
to the Presidency, see http://european-convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=41699&lang=EN  
10 The 'double-hatted' President was most prominently put forward in the Duff-Dini contribution, which advocated that
a combined Commission/Council President would enhance the EU's efficiency and transparency (CONV 524/03; for a
discussion of the advantages of such a system, see Crum and Coussens, 2003). The joint Franco-German contribution of
de Villepin and Fischer (CONV489/03) and the British 'non-paper' (Grevi 2003: 6) positioned the three countries to the
second camp endorsing the 'separate hats' option (for a critique of the Franco-German proposal, see Hughes, 2003; for
support, see Hoffman, 2003). However, the two sides did coincide with the need to establish a 'double-hatted' Minister
of Foreign Affairs. With regard to the Council Presidency, the Duff-Dini suggested a kind of rotation according to the
existing system whereas the Franco-German proposal remained quite ambiguous referring to the necessity of equal
participation of member states on a system of rotation (Hoffmann 2003: 3).  
11 The main concern expressed by smaller member-states was that such a development would reinforce the Council
against the Commission and the larger countries at the expense of the smaller ones. The EU institutional bodies opposed9
announcement of the Constitutional provisions on the Presidency led to the watering down of these
proposals but the main concept was embodied in the Draft Constitution (Article I-21) and remained
largely unscathed in the subsequent IGC.
12
Institutional Change and the EU Presidency System
The evolutionary nature of the Presidency affirms a functionalist reading of the Presidency office in
the sense that it emerged and evolved primarily as a response to the needs and the changing
conditions in the scope and pace of European integration. The ever expanding EC/EU agenda and
successive enlargements multiplied both the negotiating games and the players involved, thus
increasing the need for more efficient agenda management, inter-sectoral policy coordination and
effective brokerage. Hence, the rising demand for these functions was met by the gradual
empowerment of the rotating Council Presidency. Two basic principles of the Presidency were
entrenched from the very beginning in the design of the Presidency. The member states themselves
would perform this task instead of a collective representative (like the NATO Secretary General)
and each member state would occupy the office in turn regardless of size, economic power or
political weight (Wallace 1985: 2). 
The Presidency evolved over time in response to the changing conditions but largely preserved
these two basic organizational principles of the original format. Furthermore, the agreement
outlining the statutory position and the competence of the Presidency was framed very loosely and
outside any formal framework, setting implicitly the goal of moving integration outcomes towards
the Council's Pareto efficiency frontier rather than defining the exact modality of achieving this
goal. The assignment of these powers and functions to an office under the direct control of the (still
intergovernmental albeit majoritarian) Council and the element of rotation, which ensured co-
responsibility, appeased concerns of national sovereignty encroachment. Direct control and rotation
ensured that the strategic calculus of all constituent member-states (embedded in the broader
environment of 'nested games' with regard to the EC/EU institutional architecture) largely adhered
to this particular Presidency format. As long as such an adherence was the case, there was no need
to engage in substantial changes and the Presidency ascendance in the EU institutional order took
place within the evolutionary path that was largely defined by the early formative agreement. That
explains why the evolution of the Presidency occurred during the interregnum period between the
'big bangs' of European integration with the Council as a collective body being the entrusting agent.
                                                                                                                                                                 
the dual Presidency system on the grounds of potential power competition and institutional rivalry (Craig 2004: 16).
The 'federalist camp' tried to 'kill off' the permanent Presidency proposal by suggesting a lightening of the Presidency's
burden and the refocusing of the Presidency on the procedural responsibilities while transferring most of its executive
tasks to the Commission (Crum and Coussens 2003).   
12 For a discussion of the Treaty clauses and an assessment of the potential power and authority shifts in the emerging
Constitutional order, see Craig, 2004.10
Over this period, the Presidency is considered to have developed its own norms of neutrality and
impartiality, signifying that it constituted an office of the Union and not a means for the country
holding the Presidency to pursue national objectives.    
Contrasting the genesis and evolution of the Council Presidency to the most recent reform attempts
in the Constitution building phase, makes it easy to discern some critical points of rupture.
Significant rupture with past practices constitute both the outcome of the reform process, that is the
new hybrid format of the Presidency, and the modality of this change through formal bargaining
instead of an informal adaptation process. The functionalist approach invites us to consider the
fundamental change in the strategic EU environment within which member states interact. This new
environment -which is largely the outcome of expanding membership-, the call for a more assertive
EU international presence and more broadly the emerging constitutional order, have altered the
Presidency functions (more on which in the following section) and have challenged the capacity of
the rotating scheme to perform them. In that respect, changes in the EU environment have altered
the efficiency frontier of the Presidency, lifting for some member states the bar of the functionalist
ambition (and expectation) regarding the role and functions of the Presidency. In the emerging
environment, the collective efficiency gains to be reaped from preserving the rotating Presidency
status quo appeared highly suboptimal, at least from the standpoint of a cluster of member-states,
mainly comprising 'the big beasts in the EU jungle'. Hence, these latter withdrew their support from
the rotating format whereas other member-states in their own cost-benefit analysis continued to
adhere to the old system.
 
The reformist proposal of establishing a permanent Presidency signified a radical departure from
the two long-standing organizational tenets of the Presidency system. Decision on such a radical
rupture that would involve delegation of authority to an autonomous institutional actor and would
change the evolutionary path of the last forty years could not be taken within the framework of
Council deliberations. It had to be the subject of a major intergovernmental conference. Once
elevated to that level, the outcome would be inevitably linked to the broader integrationist agenda
and the bargaining power balances. Given the unanimity requirement for the final Constitutional
reform package, the hybrid Presidency system emerged as the 'common denominator' solution in an
attempt to bridge the gap between the two opposing camps. In that respect, the new Presidency
system is the outcome of two distinct competing strategic pursuits about the Presidency, one of
which was reinforced by forces of inertia accumulated over the last forty years. One may even
consider to what extent concerns about a violation of norms in the Presidency's performance of its
functions have been also influential for both camps in shaping their position.
13 
                                                
13 Proponents of change have put forward the argument that the permanent President will have no individual preferences
over negotiating outcomes and hence, (s)he will focus on reaching the Pareto frontier rather than sub-optimal but
national interest-enhancing decisions. Critics of the permanent Presidency have counter argued that the permanent11
We have argued that the Presidency system has evolved incrementally during the first forty years of
European integration in response to particular needs. During that period, it followed the
evolutionary path delimited in its early formative years, with change occurring outside formal
intergovernmental conferences and bargaining because of the largely convergent strategic pursuits
of member states. The new integration environment has altered the envisaged role of the
Presidency. This has led some, mostly larger, member states to adhere to a new institutional format
as better fit to meet the new challenges. The magnitude of change with the abandonment of a forty
year-long path of action (with the accumulated inertia involved) and power delegation (at least
partly) to a new institutional body was beyond the scope of the Council and required handling
within an IGC framework. The hybrid outcome reflects relative bargaining power in the IGC
negotiations, unanimity requirements and the package deal nature of the Constitutional Treaty. 
The Permanent President: An Autonomous Political Actor?
In the previous section we examined two interrelated questions about the scope and modality of
change with regard to the institutional design of the EU Presidency system. This section addresses a
critical question about the potential of the new actor(s) to provide substantial political
entrepreneurship in the EU negotiating order. Very much like the founding Treaties that made no
elaborated references to the Presidency system, the Constitutional Treaty contains quite vague
provisions with regard to the Presidency. This vagueness should be partly attributed to the nature of
the Constitutional document as an incomplete contract and partly to the member states' intention to
ensure IGC agreement. Due to this vagueness, it remains unclear what exact format the rotating
Presidency tier will have (although the attached Declaration at the end of the Constitutional Treaty
does provide draft arrangements) and perhaps more importantly how the innovative features of the
system (permanent President and Minister of Foreign Affairs) will perform. 
Problems of Delegation: Agency Losses and Control Mechanisms
We propose to conceptualize the Presidency system under the Constitutional Treaty through a
principal-agent framework. Thus the main motivations behind power delegation and agent
formation are: to resolve commitment problems given underlying collective action impediments; to
overcome information asymmetries in political and technical areas of governance and to enhance
                                                                                                                                                                 
President will be more sensitive to the positions of the big countries, thus violating the norms of neutrality and
impartiality. The often violated neutrality norm in the old system was at least compensated by the rotation element that,
first, did not allow any office holder to make too heavy an impact on the integration process and, second, gave all
member states an opportunity to play this role and take advantage of the Presidency's privileged position.    12
rule-making efficiency; and finally to reduce the political cost associated with unpopular policies
and decisions (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 4). Principals and agents enter a contractual
agreement, in which principals delegate certain functions to the agents in expectation that the latter
will deliver the desirable outcomes and enhance the principals' prosperity. The underlying
motivation is to fill in the details of the –inherently incomplete—constituent contract that outlines
the terms of the principals' interaction (Tallberg 2002a: 25-26; Pollack 1997: 102-105, etc). In the
EU framework, delegating power to the supranational agents was deemed appropriate primarily in
order to monitor compliance with EC legal obligations, ensuring the commitment of member-states
to the rules of the game (Moravcsik 1998: 485-489; Garret 1992). It has also taken place to provide
a backbone to Treaty provisions that only sketched out broad policy directions, thus enhancing the
efficiency of the EU policy-making process (Tallberg 2002a: 26-27; Pollack 1997:105-106).
Finally, it has offered the member-state governments extensive scope for blame shifting not only
with regard to policy failures but also in cases of painful but necessary decisions (Smith 1997).
However, the setting up of an agent constitutes in itself a contractual agreement, which is –to one or
another extent—incomplete. Hence, in the fulfillment of their tasks, the agents enjoy a zone of
discretion defined by the sum of delegated powers minus the sum of the ex post or ex ante control
mechanisms put in place by the principles to control the agent's actions (Thatcher and Stone Sweet
2002: 5; Calvert et al., 1989: 589; etc). The nature and strictness of these control mechanisms
depend on the purpose of delegation. If principals create an agent in order to realize pre-determined
and quite specific objectives, then the distribution of policy preferences among principals at the
time of the delegation will determine ex ante the exact scope of agent discretion. In contrast, in
cases of high level of uncertainty, rapid change or the existence of several policy alternatives along
the Pareto line, effective ex post controls will be better suited to deal with 'agency losses' (Thatcher
and Stone Sweet 2002: 5; Elster 2000). 
These control mechanisms put in place to constrain the agent's autonomous action can be either
formal or informal in nature. Formal constraints include mainly the institutional procedures that
provide the formal basis of the agency and take the form of appointment, administrative and
oversight procedures (Tallberg 2002b: 25-27; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Agents with open-
ended lifetime are less constrained than the ones subject to review at a pre-determined date.
Appointment procedures that offer the possibility of re-election generate incentives for the agent to
deliver. Administrative procedures, which further specify the agent's formal mandate, the
instruments available at its disposal and the procedural rules of action, can follow the contractual
agreement with which an agent is set in place and limit the scope of the agent's discretion. They are
ex ante, non-coercive control mechanisms that induce agent compliance (McCubbins, Noll and
Weingast 1987). Oversight procedures constitute means of ex post control, permitting the principal13
to monitor the agent's activities and impose sanctions when the agent exceeds acceptable levels of
autonomy. Informal constraints comprise basically the –most often implicit—norms associated with
the principal-agent relationship imposing ex ante constraints to the agent's behavior. Most
commonly met are the norms of efficiency (directly linked with the functional nature of the agent to
deliver prosperity-enhancing solutions to the collective action problems), neutrality and
impartiality,
14 with regard to the choice of options from the multitude available at the Pareto frontier
(Tallberg 2002b: 29).
Controlling for ‘agency losses’ becomes more complicated in cases where principals are not unified
but comprise a multitude of actors whose collective preferences about the agent's tasks and
functions may change periodically (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002: 6). Collective principals
15 are
vulnerable to the original collective action problems that the delegation aims to solve in the first
place. In situations of such complexity, it becomes more difficult for collective principals to
exercise efficient control over the agent because of the difficulties of the principals' constituent
actors to reach an agreement among themselves about the accepted level of agent slippage (Kiewiet
and McCubbins 1991). Hence, ceteris paribus, agency slippage tends to increase with the number
of actors forming the collective principal, unless there is an a priori agreement among the
principal's constituent actors to employ specific decision rules that induce a clear preference
aggregation function of the group (Lyne and Tierney 2002). 
Addressing the Challenges of the Emerging Order: Presidency Functions in the post-
Constitution EU  
The various functions of the rotating Presidency can be collapsed into four main categories:
administration and coordination; agenda shaping; mediation; and Council representation internally
and externally (Elgström 2003: 4-7; Tallberg 2003: 1; Schout 1998: 2; Kirchner 1992: 79-82;
Wallace 1985). So far, political leadership has been either an implicit component of these functions
or considered a parameter influencing the Presidency’s effectiveness. We seek to bring this issue
more prominently to the foreground. As was also argued by the reformist camp, political leadership
could be no longer effectively provided by rotating Presidencies in the EU-25 systemic
environment. Therefore the old format was incapable of continuing to perform the required tasks,
putting the effectiveness of the whole system under question. In that respect, providing political
                                                
14 Neutrality refers to situations in which the activities of an agent have no impact on the relative distribution of payoffs
among the principals. Impartiality refers to the lack of a particular bias or preference of the agent in favor of any of the
principals (cf. Young 1972: 56).
15 Note the difference between collective and multiple principals, the former suggesting a single contract of an agent
with a principal composed of more than one actor whereby the latter implying an actor with more than one contracts
with organizationally distinct principals.  14
leadership becomes the overarching function of the permanent Presidency in the new system in
order to ensure performance of the other tasks. 
The administrative and coordinating functions constitute the original functions of the Presidency,
having been the least glamorous but most important ones at least in the early period of the rotating
system (Wallace and Edwards 1976: 538). The Presidency had the overall responsibility for the
smooth functioning of the numerous working groups, requiring a great deal of organizational skills
and familiarization with the Community structure (Kirchner 1992: 79-80). Coping with such a task
involved relying on the General Secretariat of the Council, the role of which in the integration
process has remained under-explored but for a few notable exceptions (Beach 2004; Christiansen
2002). The early literature viewed the capacity of the rotating Presidency to have an impact on the
EU agenda as rather limited (Dewost 1984: 31; Kirchner 1992: 80; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace
1997: 146; etc). A broader notion of agenda-shaping was recently introduced, challenging the older
perceptions and attributing a larger role to the rotating Presidency. Agenda shaping is meant to
comprise, apart from agenda setting, agenda structuring and agenda exclusion (Tallberg 2003: 6-
13).
16 The agenda-shaping function of the Presidency has been directly linked with the mediation
function, managing conflicting preferences of member-states over policy outcomes (Metcalfe 1998;
Schout 1998). The main asset of the Presidency in performing this task has been a set of
informational and procedural resources, namely privileged information about other member-state
preferences, as well as control over the format and pace of negotiations (Tallberg 2004: 1003-1005).
Finally, the rotating Presidency was attributed the task to represent the (European) Council both
internally in its relations with the other EU institutions and externally in international fora (Kirchner
1992: 81-82). The representational function of the Presidency and the institutionalization of the
external relations of the EU have developed in tandem, the latter enhancing the status of the former
very much like in the early formative years of the Presidency office (Bengtsson 2003: 55; Wallace
1985: 3). 
   
In the new system, these four tasks have been allocated to one or the other extent to the permanent
President. To be more specific, the permanent President is entrusted with an overarching
coordinating role, being called to "…ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the
European Council" (A. I-22). The permanent President shall act in cooperation with the
Commission President and the rotating group of member states. Meeting this task suggests an even
greater reliance of the President upon the General Secretariat resources to provide the necessary
                                                
16 Agenda setting refers to accelerating the decision-making pace on specific issues by tabling concrete proposals for
action or developing new institutional practices that structure future co-operation on these specific issues. Agenda
structuring highlights the Presidency potential to put certain issues on the EU political agenda in the first place or to
alter existing policy prioritization. It becomes more important in milieus where there exists a temporal lag between the
time an issue emerges and the time actual policy-making decisions are finally taken. Finally, agenda exclusion can15
administrative back up. This development will bring this largely neglected body even more
prominently to the foreground of the integration process. Problems of coordination might arise
between the two Presidency tiers (three including the Minister of Foreign Affairs) affecting the
overall organizational performance of the Presidency system. At the same time, the longer tenure in
office of the permanent President will help him/her establish closer liaisons with the Commission
and the EP, improving inter-institutional coordination. Serious turf competition with the
Commission should not be expected to arise given that coordination/administration for most of the
day-to-day Council business will remain under the rotating Presidency tier. With respect to agenda
shaping, the permanent President does not have any Treaty-enshrined legal authority to initiate
policy proposals. However, adhering to the broader conceptualization of agenda shaping, the
President will enjoy some discretionary powers in this process, primarily by affecting policy
prioritization and exclusion of agenda items. These discretionary powers are of particular
importance especially in the EU-25 environment characterized by an expanded agenda, as member
states strive to add own policy issues or to affect the prioritization of policies already in the policy-
making pipeline. The longer tenure in office for the permanent President suggests greater continuity
in agenda management.
17 The mediating  function should be enhanced due to the prescribed
neutrality of the permanent President that will appease member-state concerns about the capacity of
the Presidency to act as a 'honest broker'. However, this function will be heavily constrained by the
unanimity decision-making rule and the formal requirement of the permanent President to endeavor
consensus within the European Council, a point to which we will return when discussing the
endogenous parameters constraining the President's scope of action. Representation will most
probably be the function most effectively performed by the permanent President in comparison with
the rotating system. The President will convey increased authority externally, as the figure
personifying the whole EU, and will project internationally an image of continuity and coherence
that will finally address concerns about 'who speaks for Europe'. At the same time, the office entails
a great deal of media exposure, which also generates a potential of public identification with the
person in office and greater chances for pursuing a more autonomous role. 
In most accounts of the EU Presidency functions, the issue of political leadership has been treated
implicitly, although its significance for the growth in scope and authority of an international
organization has been repeatedly stressed (Cox 1969: 205; Cox 1974; Schechter 1987: 197-198;
Young 1991: 281). Leadership is understood as "…an asymmetrical relationship of influence in
which one actor guides or directs the behavior of others toward a certain goal over a certain period
of time" (Underdal 1994: 178). Formal leadership refers to formally established positions of
                                                                                                                                                                 
occur either by stalling deliberation on a particular agenda item through instrumental use of the privileged control of
decision-making procedures or by presenting impossible compromise proposals (Tallberg 2003: 6-13).
17 The necessity to foster such continuity was recognized already in the rotating Presidency format. As a result, an
agreement was reached at the European Council in Seville, in 2002, requesting two consecutive Presidencies to provide
a joint action plan of their scheduled activities.    16
authority sanctioned by the principals to control an otherwise anarchical process (Smith 2002: 121),
in contrast to informal leadership that can be exercised by any resource-endowed actor in an
anarchical environment. Successful leadership does not follow a single pattern and is heavily
context- and personality-dependent. It is exercised in accordance with the particular rules of
interaction in any given institutional milieu, the limitations deriving from the constituent agreement
on the setting of an international organization, and the personal traits of the occupant of the Chair
(Schechter 1987; Burns 1978; Kille and Scully 2003). It can be of short- or medium-term nature
depending on the period of time and the kind of issues handled by the Chair (Metcalfe 1998: 414).
Three analytically distinct forms of leadership come regularly into play in international interaction:
structural, entrepreneurial, and intellectual leadership (Young, 1991). Structural leadership largely
connotes the translation of structural, resource-based power into the form of bargaining leverage in
negotiations. Entrepreneurial leadership refers to the framing of an issue in such a way as to
facilitate integrative bargaining and to strike deals that would otherwise elude negotiating partners.
Finally, intellectual leadership relies on the power of ideas to shape perspectives and orient the
involved actors to certain outcome directions.      
Prior to any discussion about the provision of political leadership in the EU by the Presidency, it is
important to stress that the Presidency has been by no means the sole supplier of leadership. Both
governmental and supranational entrepreneurs have been active in the EU negotiating order over the
years. With respect to supranational actors, the Commission has enjoyed the title of the 'motor of
integration' in the early years as well as in periods run by highly assertive and dynamic figures, who
imbued the chairmanship and the institution more generally with greater degree of autonomy (Kille
and Scully 2003: 176; for a different view Moravcsik 1999). For governmental actors, the six-
month Presidency has been the most significant opportunity to exercise leadership and leave their
distinctive stamp –to whichever extent that was feasible—on the European integration process.
Although the rotating Presidency was instrumental in striking most negotiating deals, it suffered
from the short duration of its term in office. Hence, although it could play a major leadership role
on the daily agenda management, the rotating Presidency system did not allow the country holding
the office to provide substantial medium-term leadership (Metcalfe 1998: 414). In terms of the three
analytical forms identified above, entrepreneurial leadership has been the form mostly exercised,
while the exercise of structural leadership very much depended on the resources of the member-
state holding the Presidency. On the other hand, the short duration of the rotating Presidency has
rendered the provision of intellectual leadership almost impossible. Country-specific endowment
(size, resources, political capital, etc) and the normative prescription for neutrality and impartiality
while in office have been significant parameters affecting the exercise of structural and
entrepreneurial leadership in the rotating Presidency system.  17
The establishment of the permanent President has largely come as a response to increased demand
for leadership in the EU-25 environment in order to avoid stalemate. In that respect, political
leadership, which in the past was a basic parameter in molding the office, has been converted in the
post-Constitution phase of European integration into an important function of the Presidency. The
longer period in office is the crucial element that suggests a greater potential for the President to
exercise leadership. Short-term service only allows the chair to become familiar with the
environment upon which it is called to operate and de-motivates the holder of the chair from
exhibiting strong political leadership especially on issues of high complexity. Insights from
organizational studies suggest that frequent succession of a manager or delegation of a managerial
authority to someone for a short term of tenure leads to poor performance of managerial duties.
Frequent managerial change usually produces dysfunctional consequences within an organization
(Hall 1996:148-158). In that respect, the two and a half years in office with the possibility for an
extension to five, will offer the opportunity to the President for a medium-term, political leadership
horizon, relieving the President from more narrow-focused requests for short-term leadership. In
terms of leadership forms, the prevailing consensual ethos that is now formally enshrined in the
Treaty provisions, points more towards an entrepreneurial leadership style facilitated by the
capacity to build Pareto-enhancing package deals over the whole range of integration issue areas.
Structural leadership should be somehow circumscribed by the resources available to the President
–these will be discussed in the next section. What can constitute a potential path-breaking
leadership contribution is the capacity during the President’s term in office to introduce and
establish conceptual blueprints framing future policy deliberation. 
We have argued that the typology identifying four basic functions for the rotating Presidency
system largely holds for the permanent President as well. Administration and coordination may be
strained between the two different Presidency tiers but the longer-term tenure of the President
suggests a better working relationship with the other institutional bodies. The permanent President
will also enjoy some discretionary power in agenda shaping, deriving primarily from his/her
privileged position in control of procedural policy-making mechanisms and his/her mediating skills.
The mediating function should be better performed due to the assumed neutrality of the President
that will facilitate agreement. The same holds for the representation function –both internally and
internationally—due to the permanent President’s greater authority to 'speak for Europe'. In these
four functions, we have argued that an overarching fifth one should be added, namely the provision
of political leadership, which will facilitate the performance of all other four functions.  
A New Actor in Town? Presidential Resources and Parameters of Effectiveness18
When we discussed the reasons behind the transformation of the rotating Presidency system, our
basic argument was that the changes in the EU systemic environment altered (some) member states'
perceptions of the Presidency's efficiency frontier. Whereas in the past member states were more or
less in accord about the rotating scheme's potentiality to perform effectively its functions, that was
no longer the case in the deliberations preceding the drafting of the Constitution. Our contention is
that the potential of the permanent President (and MFA) to solidify his/her status in the new order
and develop into an influential institutional actor will largely depend on the successful fulfillment of
his/her tasks and on his/her ability to bypass the control mechanisms devised by member states to
monitor and check for the Presidency’s action. Successful performance will depend on the available
resources of the permanent President and the exogenous and endogenous parameters that may
interfere in the performance of the tasks. Such an argument derives to a large extent from the
functional conceptualization of the Presidency and is supported by the historical account presented
earlier, which showed that the successful Presidency’s response to the tasks requested by the
Council contributed to the strengthening of the Presidency and the rise of its stature. However, the
strengthening of the Presidency –if exceeding the limits acceptable by member-states—will be
constrained by the normative and institutional parameters that prevent the agent (President) from
running out of the principal’s (member states) control. In this context we now move to examine the
Presidency’s resources and the parameters (systemic, personality-specific, normative and
institutional) affecting efficient performance. 
Presidency Resources
With respect to effectiveness and efficiency, we need to consider the resources available for the
President to perform the required functions (and draw comparisons with the rotating tier) and the
parameters (exogenous and endogenous) that will influence the President’s performance. To begin
with the first, the permanent President's resources are primarily informational and operational (Moe
and Howell 1999:138), linked with informational asymmetries, bureaucratic  resources, and the
capacity of the President to exercise coercion or reward certain behavior. Additional resources
comprise the level of the President's legitimacy and authority as well as socialization resources
(Metcalfe 1998: 416-426).
Information-based resources constitute a very crucial asset to the fulfillment of the Presidential
tasks and functions. It is the Chair's responsibility to collect and accordingly communicate selected
information to establish the agreement zones among the interacting partners (Raiffa 1982: 108).
Resorting to existing bureaucratic resources –with main reference the Council Secretariat that will
take up the task to provide administrative support to the President—and procedural arrangements
(capital tours, bilateral meetings at various levels etc), the EU President will get hold of privileged19
preference information. Longer tenure in office should be expected to create economies of scale in
the gathering and instrumental use of collected information.
Among operational resources, of greater importance for the EU President are the coercion and
reward opportunities. In the rotating Presidency format, the most significant coercive resource has
been the (not so often realized) threat to call a QMV vote wherever the unanimity rule did not
apply. In that respect, coalition building capacity (Elgström et al. 2001) in the Council context was
an important parameter for a successful Presidency in the rotating system to perform its mediating
function and move negotiating outcomes beyond 'common denominator' options by coercing
recalcitrant member states. In the new Constitutional order, such a possibility will be largely
available only to the rotating tier of the Presidency at the technical Councils, with the European
Council retaining the principle of unanimity unless it decides differently. However, in the context of
unanimity decision-making in the European Council and given the repeated interactions taking
place during the President’s tenure, the President will be equipped with more “bullying power”
towards any single outlier member state as compared to the six-month rotating Presidency. As a
delimiting factor of the Presidency’s coercive resources, the Constitutional Treaty provides that the
President “…shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council”
(A.I-22). Reward resources entail the available to the President means (concessions, side-payments,
etc) to produce Pareto-enhancing deals thus improving the attractiveness of a joint agreement
(Carnevale, 1986). Although the Presidency cannot –strictly speaking—take the decision on such
rewards, it can lead to the desired outcome by making instrumental use of its mediation and agenda-
shaping powers (Tallberg, 2004 and 2003). The Constitutional Treaty does not seem to enhance
significantly the reward resources of the Presidency, with a notable –indirect—exception, albeit one
of far reaching consequences: the potential for effectively striking package agreements. The
extended (compared to the previous six-month format) time horizon in the permanent President’s
tenure and the cross-disciplinarity of scope ensure an agenda continuity and potential issue linkages
that multiply the chances of successfully negotiating complex package agreements. 
With regard to the legitimacy and authority factors, the rotating Presidency format suffered from the
underlying suspicion that the country holding the office may use it to promote own national
objectives despite an at least rhetorical adherence to the principle of neutrality. In that respect,
negotiating outcomes were always under the hovering doubt about whether they indeed represented
optimal solutions or whether further shifts closer to the efficiency frontier were left unrealized due
to negative distributional implications for the Chair. Hence, the Presidency carried the burden of
convincing member states that its political objectives and actions were not nationally oriented
(Metcalfe 1998: 420). That needs no longer be the case given the presumed impartiality of the
permanent President with respect to the interests of the member states. After all, that was one of the20
main arguments in favor of establishing the permanent Presidency format (Hoffman, 2003). Hence,
impartiality can substantially improve the legitimacy of Presidential action and facilitate the
performance of the Presidential tasks. As far as authority is concerned, the provision that the
permanent President of the European Council shall not hold a national office has been claimed to
undermine his/her status and political authority, not matching the previous levels of authority
brought to the Presidency by acting Prime Ministers or Heads of State (Hughes, 2003). This,
however, should not necessarily be the case if the President comes from the league of former prime
ministers or heads of state.
Finally, socialization resources entail the emergence of a common perspective through repeated
social interaction of some longer duration. In international relations, it has been argued that such an
interaction increases the likelihood of successful inter-state mediation (Wall and Lynn 1993: 173).
In the case of the permanent President, the longer tenure in office (two and a half years renewable
once, in comparison to the six-month rotating format) enhances substantially the chances of
familiarization and engrenage with a particular style and mode of mediation. In turn, that will affect
positively the performance of the Presidential tasks. 
In a nutshell, the permanent President seems to be bestowed with greater resources compared to
those at the disposal of the rotating Presidencies in terms of rewards, less so in terms of coercion.
However, the longer tenure in office does suggest a significant increase in the socialization and
information-based resources. In addition to that, relieved from doubts about his/her own neutrality
and impartiality, the President will enjoy a greater legitimacy (but lower authority?) in his/her
actions that will further enhance the President’s potential to successfully pursue the office tasks. 
Exogenous and Endogenous Parameters
Besides the availability of resources, successful performance will also depend on a set of (a)
exogenous (i.e. environment-related) and  (b) endogenous (i.e. Presidency-related) parameters.
(a) Exogenous parameters comprise both international and EU systemic developments that affect
the President's resources (and in turn the capacity to perform the required tasks) and/or have an
impact on the tasks themselves. Such international system related factors include general conditions
of enmity or amity in the world, global threats (the 'War on Terror'), the status of transatlantic
relations, humanitarian and other international (e.g. Iraq) crises, etc. Given that external EU
representation is one of the main tasks of the President, developments (whether positive or
negative) outside the EU milieu will have a significant impact on his/her status and profile and will
affect the President’s available resources (authority). At the same time, many of these developments21
will trigger tensions among the EU partners, in particular in controversial cases like the recent Iraq
crisis, thus rendering the President's functions much more difficult to execute. 
EU systemic developments include the pace of integration, the EU political and economic
environment and the decision-making system at European Council level. Starting from the latter, we
pointed out earlier while discussing the President’s coercive resources that broader use of QMV
increases the powers of the Presidency. Therefore, the more the European Council departs from the
unanimity principle, the more empowered the permanent President will become by having the
discretionary power to call for a vote. However, such decisions to shift away from consensus
building even at the top EU level suggest an integration-prone environment and at least some
degree of adherence to more federalist visions. In such an acceleration of the integration pace, the
EU President will have a catalytic role to play in orchestrating the overall procedure. The reverse
will also hold true: periods of a downturn in the pace of integration, characterized by strong
adversary macro-policy preferences, will negatively affect the capacity of the President to deliver
upon his/her tasks. This is directly linked with the existing political and economic environment in
EU countries, in the sense that in periods of public disillusionment and apathy or even antipathy for
the EU venture, failing commitments by national governments to the objectives of integration, and
cyclical problems in the European economy, the President will have a much more difficult mission
to carry out. Again, an opposite set of macro-conditions will be conducive to a Presidency excelling
in its performance and drawing the resulting credit for it. Domestic political or other national crises
at least in the larger member-states might still create some difficulties in the execution of the
permanent President's tasks. However, a major deficiency of the old rotating system has been
significantly remedied, namely the possibility of the President-country subject to a domestic crisis
to divert vital political resources from the exercise of the Presidency. Such unfortunate situation
could continue to create problems in the rotating tier of the new system but the team element
introduced in the draft Declaration annexed to the Constitutional Treaty may well offset such
problems as well. 
(b) As far as the endogenous set of parameters is concerned, there were distinctive differences
between Presidencies in the old rotating system with respect to country-specific resources (political
capital, disposition towards European integration, size, experience and socialization with European
norms, etc) (Westlake 1995: 49-50; Kirchner 1992: 82-87 etc). On the analogy of that, the
effectiveness and efficiency of the permanent President will depend on personality-specific and
institutional design-specific characteristics as well as the evolution of the norms associated with the
President's office. 22
Personality-specific parameters broadly relate to the beliefs, motives, decision style and
interpersonal style of a political leader and take us well into the political psychology and behavior
literature. Such characteristics interrelate to form a personal, behavioral orientation and a general
way of responding to environmental challenges (Hermann 1980: 8-12). Further personal leadership
qualities, like strategic vision, managerial and communicative skills, self-confidence, energy and
endurance, mastery of technical and conceptual details, and overall intellect will also play a critical
role in that respect (cf. Yuki 1981: 270; Bercovitch 1984). Hence, personality-specific attributes are
bound to affect the President's performance to one direction or another. 
Institutional design-specific characteristics, besides resorting to QMV for decision-making as
discussed earlier, also refer to the mode of the Presidential selection and the way the control
mechanisms, set in place to check for the President's actions, will operate. With regard to the
former, the Constitutional Treaty allows for decision on the President’s appointment to be taken by
QMV. However, a consensual appointment will increase the President's legitimization and
authority, thus strengthening the available resources. 
As far as the control mechanisms are concerned, we have argued that setting up an agent is
accompanied with the establishment of appropriate control mechanisms and an incentive structure
to avoid 'agency losses'. The objective is to induce the agent to act in a manner consistent with the
principal's expectations and ensure that the potential costs of the agent's over-assertiveness during
the performance of their basic functions are checked.  In the case of the permanent President, both
ex ante and ex post control has been arranged applying formal and informal constraints. To start
with, the President-agent has a specific lifetime of two and a half years. Offering the possibility for
a single renewal of the tenure, EU member states have created a favorable incentive structure for
the President to act in consistence with the prescribed requirements of the office. By an inverse
logic, a second-term “lame duck” President may be set free from first-term constraints, keen
towards a more “heroic” exercise of his/her duties, with an eye on personal historical legacy. 
At the same time, ex post control has been also set in place with reference to the point of dismissal
in case of an impediment or serious misconduct. This oversight procedure will be applied by use of
qualified majority, thus addressing the weakness of a collective principal, which we have
highlighted in the previous section. As a reminder, the relevant literature points to the fact that a
collective principal is subject to the original collective action problems and faces problems in
agreeing on acceptable levels of 'agency losses'. In that respect, the more the actors constituting a
principal the more the opportunities of an agent exercising autonomous action, unless the actors
comprising the principal agree a priori on specific decision-making rules. That is the case with the23
dismissal of the permanent President, whereby member states have agreed on QMV to facilitate
oversight control and minimize the President’s chances for autonomous action. 
Finally, normative parameters entail the adherence to the formal or informal norms associated with
the Presidency. For example, the existing ethos of exhaustive consultation to reach consensual
agreements, which has been actually articulated explicitly and enshrined formally in the
Constitutional Treaty directing the permanent President towards seeking "cohesion and consensus",
could operate as an impediment to the successful performance of the Presidency. A gradual erosion
of this norm, that operates as an ex ante control mechanism to the President's behavior, can pave the
way for the introduction of QMV even at European Council level decision-making with very
important consequences for the Presidential role and performance. Such a development would
expand the available resources of the President and allow him/her to adopt a more confrontational
stance to the outlying member states. By the same token, a gradual erosion of the informal norms of
efficiency and neutrality that presumably underlie the President's actions may have far reaching
consequences for the performance of the Presidential functions. 
A first tentative assessment of the new Presidency system in terms of available resources and the
exogenous as well as endogenous parameters that will affect its effectiveness and efficiency,
conveys an image of qualified yet unmistakable strengthening of the Presidential function. On
resources, it is rather straightforward that the longer tenure of the permanent President –in
comparison to the rotating format—will enhance socialization- and information-based resources as
well as the capacity for package deals that need time and ripening conditions. In addition to that, the
(presumed) neutrality of the permanent President will further his/her legitimacy especially if the
President’s appointment is decided consensually. We do not agree that the President’s status will be
undermined by the requirement for the President not to hold any national office during tenure.
Actually a President unshackled from national-domestic electoral constraints will be much freer to
develop a more autonomous political agenda for the EU. If the President originates from the league
of former prime ministers and heads of state, as appears to be the case, status problems and
authority in the eyes of the peers should not be of issue. Finally, coercion may gradually evolve into
a significant additional resource if the integration pace accelerates and QMV expands as a decision-
making rule at the European Council level as well. 
However, the realization of the resource potential will depend on several parameters. The
integration pace will be a crucial exogenous parameter in the shaping and actual status of the new
post, especially in the early formative years, which are bound to influence future Presidential
behavior and expectations. Other EU systemic or international developments may also have a24
critical impact but the unpredictable nature of most of them renders difficult any prior assessment.
With regard to endogenous parameters, the evolution of the permanent President status will also
depend a lot on the personality-specific leadership qualities of the person holding the office,
molding to a large extent the Presidential profile. Regarding the institutional parameters, the
appointment and oversight procedures include a propitious incentive structure by offering the
opportunity for re-appointment and potential sanctions by allowing for dismissal in cases of
misconduct. To ensure meaningfulness of these control mechanisms, member states agreed on
applying the QMV decision-making rule in choosing the President, aiming to avoid collective
action impediments that constrain the action of a collective principal. As regards the normative
dimension of the Presidency, previously implicit norms have now been institutionalized by being
enshrined in the Constitutional Treaty, functioning as additional means to control for the President’s
‘agency losses’.
Conclusions
This paper has explored continuity and change in the EU Presidency system under the new
Constitutional order. There is no doubt that the Constitution creates a new institutional actor; the
question is whether and to what extent the President will potentially play an autonomous political
role as well. Such assessment can of course only be tentative until we see how the new system
operates in practice. It goes without saying, the whole discussion may turn out to be redundant
should Constitution ratification fail. 
The first set of arguments we have presented builds on the functional ability of the Presidency to
fulfill specific tasks in the course of European integration. These tasks evolved over time without
altering, however, member-state perceptions of the efficiency frontier of the rotating Presidency
system. The new structural environment of the EU-25 has broken the common conceptualization of
the Presidency's functions and the shared view concerning the rotating system's ability to perform
these functions. The required changes suggested a significant overhaul of the old system to be dealt
with only in a major IGC negotiating context, out of which the current hybrid Presidency system
emerged as a compromise solution. We have used a ‘principal-agent’ framework to discuss the
potential of the permanent President emerging as an autonomous political actor in the EU context.
Realizing this potential will depend on the successful execution of the Presidential functions. We
have examined these functions emphasizing the request for political leadership in the EU-25.
Effective performance of the Presidential functions will be contingent on the permanent President’s
available resources, most of which are bound to be enhanced by the longer tenure and presumed
neutrality of the President. However, the successful employment of these resources will depend on a25
number of exogenous and endogenous parameters, comprising developments in the EU and
international systemic environment, the personal attributes of the President, institutional-design
specific characteristics and the norms associated with the office. 
Taking a step back to grasp the full picture of the new system, it seems that the current state of
affairs is rather conducive for the permanent President to consolidate his/her position in the
emerging post-Constitution order. Hence, our analysis suggests an unmistakable though by no
means unconditional strengthening of the Presidency’s potential for an autonomous political role in
the new EU constitutional architecture. In the EU-25, the great diversity of opinions and policy
preferences will provide numerous opportunities for the President to exercise political leadership
and drive forward the integration vehicle, thus enhancing his/her own political role in the system. It
seems that this potential has not passed unnoticed by member states, especially the ones least
enthusiastic about the appointment of a permanent President. This lack of consensus and the
innovative (and therefore uncharted) nature of such an appointment have dictated elaborate control
mechanisms to appease opposition, ensure compliance with the requirements of the office and
decrease as much as possible the chances of having a new autonomous political actor in town.
However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms remains to be seen, especially given the
President’s continuous visibility and identification with the EU in the public eye. Such public
visibility will enhance the President’s slack potential. Furthermore, given the vagueness of the
Constitutional provisions regarding the President’s status (the Constitution being an incomplete
contract), the exact configuration of the President’s power and autonomy will be largely determined
by the interaction with the other EU institutions, not least the potential rivalry with the Commission.
This could be particularly the case in areas of overlapping or underspecified authority and
jurisdiction, e.g. global representation beyond foreign and security policy, and so on. The early
formative years could be decisive for the exact position and role of the President in the EU
architecture. In that respect it is critical to identify the right figure for the post, not least since
appointment procedures allow for QMV.  26
Functions Effectiveness of President
Administration-Coordination  Overarching coordinating role; 
Inter-institutional coordination improved due to approximation of
tenure with that of Commission President and MEPs;
No serious turf competition with Commission expected;
Potential coordination problems with other tiers of Presidency
system;
Heavy reliance on Secretariat General.
Agenda Shaping No formal power available; important discretionary power
deriving from policy prioritization and procedural control of
negotiations; greater agenda continuity due to longer tenure in
office.
Mediation More effective due to neutrality and impartiality principles; 
More effective due to longer tenure (for complex package deals
that require persistency and ripening conditions);
Constraints from unanimity decision-making rule and
(constitutionally enshrined) norms of “cohesion and consensus”.  
Representation More effective both externally (conveying image of continuity,
projecting EU collective power) and internally (media exposure
and public identification);
Possible problems with regard to external representation due to
competition with Commission President in areas other than
foreign and security policy (and Foreign Minister?).  
Political Leadership More effective in terms of medium-term leadership; longer tenure
allows familiarization with issues and longer perspective; more
probable an entrepreneurial style of leadership, less so for
intellectual and structural.    
Resources Availability to President
Informational Exploitation of information asymmetries with resort to existing
bureaucratic resources (Council Secretariat) and procedural
arrangements (bilateral meetings at various levels, capital tours, etc). 
Operational: 
Coercion
Reward
Minimal coercion power due to unanimity decision-making rule and
norm of consensus seeking; however, longer tenure increases “bullying
power” potential of the President. 
Reward resources not available strictly speaking; but by instrumental use
of agenda shaping and mediation functions, President in place to reward
behaviors; longer tenure and cross-disciplinarity of agenda scope may
facilitate complex package deals.
Legitimacy - Authority Presumed impartiality of President enhances legitimacy; 
Questions about authority given that the President shall not be acting
Prime Minister or Head of State.
Socialization Longer tenure may facilitate familiarization with a particular Presidential
style through repeated social interaction; engrenage effect. 27
Parameters  Impact on Performance
Exogenous
International 
(global developments; transatlantic
relations; humanitarian crises and military
imbroglios; etc)
In general significant impact: President responsible
for EU external representation; such developments
will affect Presidential profile;   
EU systemic 
(pace of integration; EU political and
economic environment; decision making
system at European Council level)
Acceleration of integration and propitious political
and economic environment conducive to more
successful Presidency (and the reverse); 
Move away from unanimity, more success potential
for President. 
Endogenous
Personality-specific  Beliefs, motives, leadership style; managerial skills,
etc
Institutional Design-specific:
Decision-making rule
Mode of President selection
Control Mechanisms
 (Incentives and Penalties)
 
Shifts towards QMV, more success potential.
Consensual selection (despite Treaty provisions for
QMV) will enhance the President's legitimacy and
authority.
Incentives: reappointment (inverse incentive
structure under 'lame duck' second term);
Penalties: dismissal (facilitated by use of QMV);
According to how these structures will operate, the
President will have more or less autonomy potential.
 
Norm-related (formal and informal
norms) 
Erosion of formal 'cohesion and consensus' norms
may pave the way for QMV 
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